sees a growing awareness of 'manufactured' risk and uncertainty and the limitations of technological fixes in such societies, and a change of political debate and expression from emancipatory politics concerned with 'freedom from oppression, with social justice and with the diminishing of socioeconomic inequalities ' (1995: 7) towards what he calls 'life politics'. Post-materialism is also a feature of recent postmodem critiques of development which raise important challenges to poverty discourses. For me, this also raises concerns about the possibly ethnocentric politics, not to mention the wellbeing outcomes, of western postmaterialism in a world of continuing and severe material inequalities.
Although postmodernism' has been slow to take root in development studies this state of affairs is changing quite rapidly Both poverty and gender and development (GAD) paradigms contrast starkly with some basic postmodernist stances (Gardener and Lewis 1996; Nicholson 1990; Parpart 1993; Escobar 1995) . This brief essay intends to open up discussion around two broad questions: first, what elements in a postmodernist approach are particularly challenging to ideas about poverty, development and gender analysis? Second, with regard to some of these problem areas, what ideas, approaches and discursive I use the terms postmodernism and poststructuralism fairly interchageably since the differences are not significant for my purpose here and the overlap is considerable. Included within the terms here are the rejection of a rationalist world view and modernity, of the idea of objective reality, of the project of grand theory and the dominance of western knowledge systems (especially science). Alternative approaches are based instead on deconstruction, on discourse analysis and textuality, on Foucauldian notions of power and on local narratives or stories rather than meta-narratives, the dominant truth claims of modernity Vast literatures surround these areas which I make no attempt to survey, but merely indicate a small selection of particularly relevant and accessible material. Post Poverty,
Gender and
Development?
Cecile Jackson IDS Bulletin Vol 28 No 3 1997 resources might gender analysis draw upon in a response to the postist critique that is positive but ultimately sustains a belief in some non-negotiable idea of gender justice and well-being rights? At the very schematic level possible here I have not disaggregated approaches to poverty reduction or poverty definitions in any detail. This is because at heart they all assume that progress is possible, that material deprivation is universally harmful and unjust, that gender relations and interests accentuate or modify the experience of poverty and that there is some kind of role for development interventions in redressing this situation.
Certain varieties of poverty understandings are less susceptible to the poststructural critique, such as the more qualitative and subjectively-defined positions. But it seems to me that none escape unscathed. Martha Nussbaum's account of the WIDER2 conferences of the late 1980s sets out the encounter between development theorists of poverty and postmodernists rather memorably She describes how discussions of 'quality of life' led on to the questions of cultural relativism y universalism, that is, whether we should seek universal measures of quality of life for all men and women, or 'defer instead to the many different norms that traditional cultures have selected' (Nussbaum and Glover 1995: 4) . The choice between the voice of tradition or a critical universalism, in this case Sen's capabilities framework, is depicted in the exchanges between those taking up these opposing stances on embeddedness and freedom. In one instance, poststructuralists saw unified value systems which consider menstruating women as polluting in both the home and the workplace as admirably embedded, while universalists regarded such practices as devaluing and inhibiting to women. In another interchange, poststructuralists objected to capability talk on the grounds that it universalises the western attachment to freedom of choice, citing as evidence the delegation of choice over what to eat or wear by Japanese males to their wives (op cit. 64). In these examples universalists have defended the rights of individual women and men to freedom (from constraining or devaluing pollution beliefs) 2 Arguments about well-being and the relativist challenge, are set out clearly in relation to gender and development in the published work emerging from the WIDER conferences on the quality of life (Nussbaum and Sen 146 and to the capability for independent existence, or autonomy Postmodemists have, on the other hand, regarded these qualities as culturally and historically relative to the value system of the west, and as cultural expressions of different rather than inferior value systems, in which the individual is embedded in his or her community and questions of freedom are inappropriate. That these issues are intensely gendered is indicated in these examples, for the meaning of embeddedness is clearly rather different for different actors. But the point I wish make here is that if the capabilities approach is contested in this way then so too are poverty assessments, lines and indeed any attempt to specify human need.
Sen's capabilities approach to well-being asks 'what are the people of country X actually able to be and do?' and compares the answers (the functionings) for different groups within that country. It is not inherently universalistic as functionings could be entirely locally specified, but Sen has insisted that capabilities, as indeed his cooperative conflicts model of intrahousehold relations does, need to go beyond 'utility' as the satisfaction of subjective preferences, to recognise that preferences can be distorted by power relations and the experience of deprivation. Therefore they cannot be a complete account of well-being. Thus Sen, and particularly Martha Nussbaum, would argue that the approaches taken in the Human Development
Report cannot be irrelevant to understandings of well-being.
What then are the features, very broadly, of poverty talk which are in the firing line, and what are some of the implications for gender and development?
Poverty discourses are, of course, far from unchanging or consensual. For example, their consideration of needs is suspect from the perspective of many orthodox economists for whom needs are simply subjective preferences which determine priorities free from any objective or universal hierarchy of need. However, Marxist challenges to the equation of wants and needs, and the basic needs school in development studies, has established an approach to well-being which transcends subjective preferences, and commodity consumption, towards a 1993), the following volume which applied the capabilities approach to gender (Nussbaum and Glover 1995) , as well as the Apffel-Marglin and Marglin collection (1990) . broader understanding and a normative stance based on universal need (see Doyal and Gough 1991) . This is a reasonable approximation of what is implicitly common to poverty and GAD discourses and interventions. In the following sections I consider some of the arguments made against poverty reduction and GAD in postmodernist critiques, and I attempt to find a constructive engagement with these, whilst defending a form of feminist humanism (Soper 1990 ).
'Things to Words'
Understandings of inequality, power, dominance 'lost their purchase' by comparison to the arts, humanities and philosophy, and interest is now greatest in symbolisation, representation, subjectivity and the self (Barrett 1992 ).
The shift from materialism is a feature of postist understandings of poverty, where culture, ideas and symbols are discursively interesting and constitutive of power, whilst materiality is of questionable status, and at least suspect. From such a perspective, poverty is then discursively constructed as a justification for development activity, and poverty as an experience becomes largely a state of mind, rather than a state of mind and body as previous formulations might suggest. The conservatism which follows upon the absence of materialist perspectives in some new social movements (e.g. the New Ageist: 'You can be happy living in cardboard boxes' and 'poverty [is) ..a gift' (Pepper 1993: 142) ) serves as a warning of the implications of an exclusively non-materialist concept of poverty
In development studies as a discipline, there have been similar shifts away from the emphases on, for example, basic needs a couple of decades ago, which were clearly oriented around material needs, to the current neo-liberal agenda of democracy and liberalisation. Katherine Fierlbeck points out that one of the consequences has been that the material 147 inequality of women has been eclipsed by the principle of 'consent' as the basis of political legitimacy:
The brutal paradox is that whilst the least controversial evidence of women's marginalisation is the striking and physical and economic disparity they experience, such disparity can be dismissed as relevant proof of marginalisation as long as women can be perceived to have 'consented' to such conditions. (Fierlbeck 1995: 24) Social relations of material inequality are thereby placed beyond critique by the idea of consent.
A mechanically materialist approach to poverty is patently unsatisfactory, and this has been argued in gender studies where notions of well-being clearly include qualities beyond command over material resources. But the refusal to acknowledge physical needs, such as health (and even life), as centrally constitutive of well-being is equally problematic, as three examples of postmodern work which stress cultural violence and give little significance to physical bodily violence, show. Gayatri Spivak's famous article on sati (1985) , which analyses the anti-sati colonial legislation, and its pro-sati opposition, argues that both the colonial British and indigenous Hindu cultures discursively objectified the women they positioned in either 'the Hindu manipulation of female subject-constitution' (Spivak 1985: 127, original emphasis) , or in the case of the British, as victims requiring protection, thereby justitifying the 'civilising' mission of colonialism. But no weight is given to the real deaths of real women, and both the attack and the defence of sati are damned equally Felix Padel's book on the colonial eradication of Kond traditions of human sacrifice and female infanticide in Orissa insists that this was a greater violence than the very numerous deaths of girls and sacrificial victims (Padel 1995) . Finally Frederique Apffel-Marglin's analysis of smallpox innoculation campaigns argues that outlawing traditional Indian prophylaxis (variolation) and imposing vaccination, which was more effective and much safer, was an example of the 'logocentric medical (and developmental) discourse [which] constructs death as the absolutely negative ' (1990: 124) . She goes further than Spivak and Padel to suggest that lives saved by vaccination rather than variolation were not a justification for its imposition, for she argues against what she sees as the western binary opposition of life and death, and the idea of death as enemy and as failure. However in all these examples the material outcomes for the lives of those who experienced these struggles, foreshortened lives and painful deaths for some, seems to me to be both highly relevant and worrying absent.
Postmodern ideas about power emphasise not systematically unequal access to resources but differential abilities to make and shape discourse and language (as statements, terms, categories and beliefs), whilst poverty and well-being is at least partly about command over material resources. Needs are discursive in postmodern perspectives. They are constituted by language with little or no reference to material relations, yet from a gender perspective power relations have been conceptualised as both material and discursive, and linked in complex ways rather than one way determinations. capita food availability in the south has not increased but he gives no serious attention to the veracity of this assertion or to changes over time (1995: 103) . He is satisfied with a crudely functionalist view in which the development apparatus is said to create client categories ('malnourished', 'lactating women' etc) which are 'consistent with the creation and reproduction of modem capitalist relations' (op cit. 106). Whilst Escobar states that 'there is no discourse analysis that is unrelated to materialities ' (1995: 130) he fails to deliver an account of this relatedness which is other than that of determining and powerful discourse 'making' the Third World.
Whilst one would agree with the importance of a discourse analysis and of institutional ethnography, this needs to be harnessed to relations between these and material outcomes, which do not follow in a linear fashion from policy hopes, intentions There are many humanisms -for example, liberalism qualities of individual human beings and on the goal of and Marxism are humanist -but all centre on the special the full development of each human being's potential.
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and statements (see Apthorpe and Gasper 1996) . One example of a feminist approach which seems to me to deal with how to retain a materialist element in understandings of gendered poverty, but one which is sensitive to the complex relationships between material life and symbolic and cultural meanings, is the work on embodied subjectivity and gender. This links the objective material needs of women with the subjective, culturalised ideas about, and constructions of, needs in a useful way, and denies the dualistic character of the words y things arguments. Thus Henrietta Moore indicates the usefulness of Bourdieu's concept of habitus as 'that set of structuring principles and common schemes of perception and conception that generate practices and representations ' (1994: 78) .
Subjectivity is material, social distinctions are enacted through one's body, over time. The 'subject is never separated from the material conditions of its existence, and the world is never free of the representations that construct it' (Moore 1994: 80) .
Humanism and Essentialism in Poverty Reduction and GAD
Humanism3 has become a major target of postmodernist critique; thus development can be derided as that 'most noble of activities, the be-all and end-all of the humanist project: the improvement of the human condition' (Hirschmann 1995: 44) by postmodernist feminist critics, in this case attacking the DAWN book (Sen and Grown 1988) for placing poor women at the centre of their analysis.
The problem with humanism is that it is seen to be irretrievably contaminated by a particular notion of the human subject which requires an object to dominate (Rosenau 1992: 46) and which is associated with imperialism, for example in the idea of colonialism as a civilising mission. Further, the human subject is constructed in a particular form, rational, white and male, with the ethnocentric and androcentric assumptions this entails. (Rosenau 1992: 94) .
The question of representation has been problematised by postmodernism in a way which has given new urgency to discussions about women's gender interests and how they can be known in a development context (Molyneux 1985 (Molyneux , 1997 Jones and Jonasdottir, 1988; Fierlbeck 1996 This is hardly a resolution, and arguably a feeble declaration of intent, but an awareness of this problem has certainly characterised GAD discourses.
What requires defence in a postmodern ambience is the assertion that beyond women's voices are legitimate representations of 'objective' gender interests (Sen 1990) , and that it is possible to speak for some subaltern interests identified in this way, not as a substitute for self perceptions of gender interests but as a legitimate dimension through which to engage with, and understand, these perceptions. The distinction between interests and needs goes back to the beginning of the 1980s in GAD, and if there is a consensus it is probably around the idea that gender interests are everywhere different, change over time, and are distinguished by their short-and long-term, practical or strategic character. Needs too are socially constructed (but not only), they are dynamic and they are politicised in every element. But instead of rejecting the needs idiom Nancy Fraser usefully asks 'What opportunities and/or obstacles does the needs idiom pose for movements, like feminism, that seek far-reaching social transformation? ' (1990: 162) This indeed is what the recent debates about gender and poverty have been centrally about.
The ways in which GAD may strengthen its discursive understandings is suggested in Nancy Fraser's framework which illuminates two important parts of that debate; firstly, the ways in which gender has become institutionally married to poverty (Jackson 1996; Kabeer 1996 ; Chant this volume); and secondly, the processes which lead to internalisation of subordination norms by women.
Fraser suggests shifting focus from needs alone to include discourses about needs, and this allows attention to the politics of need at three levels: the struggle to establish or refute the status of a need;
the struggle over interpretation of the need, to define it and thereby define how it might be met;
and the struggle over the meeting of needs, to obtain or refuse provision (Fraser 1989: 164) . The discursive resources available in these struggles include the recognised idioms of needs, rights and interests, the range of vocabularies for making claims (e.g. administrative, feminist), the styles of argumentation (e.g. appeal to forms of legitimacy such as democratic processes), the according of privilege to certain groups, (such as the 'needy'), the narrative conventions which establish social identities, and, finally, the modes of subjectification, i.e.
the ways in which people are positioned and endowed with expected qualities -for example, as victims, as activists, as deviants, or as deserving.
Early feminists in development successfully established arguments about the particular needs of women through the work of authors such as Boserup who used recognised idioms and vocabularies of exclusion, and of potential contribution to
It was unfortunate that the important and valid arguments which pointed to the inadequacies of western feminist ideas about women in the south, and to differences within the category 'women', resonated with 151 economic development. Later work in the WID paradigm made explicit claims for the efficiency of gender-aware development and sectoral specifications consistent with the conventional adminstrative divisions of labour in development agencies. In these discursive struggles, poverty arguments that women were 'the poorest of the poor' had a special place, since poverty reduction lies beyond questions at the heart of development studies and practice, and the portrayal of women as poor, helpless, virtuous and deserving was, arguably, very discursively effective. The discussion of the consequences of these strategies, and the critique of development agencies 'instrumentalism', continues (see IDS Bulletin Vol 23 No 3), and new discursive opportunities present themselves, for example in the current efforts, much in evidence at Beijing in 1995, to slipstream human rights vocabularies. Within this changing terrain the DAWN book has been discursively significant and effective since it intervened with 'voices of women of the south' at a time when development conventions were taking a conveniently participatory turn, and in a way which neutralised reactionary arguments that feminism was the sole concern of white western women6. To criticise the DAWN book for essentialism, as
Hirschmann (1995) rather than a need. Needs talk also varies with the 'discursive publics' involved, i.e. the content and forms of argumentation depend on the socially differentiated publics they aim at; publics formed by relations of occupation, power, of class, of political ideology. Thus, certain needs are depoliticised by enclaving them as personal or domestic (e.g. reproductive needs) and therefore private and non-political; or as economic (e.g. gender differentials in wages) and therefore technical and non-political.
These discourses are directed to specialised publics associated with, say, family planning or economic planners, and thereby enclaved and bounded from recognition as contested. This is partly why members of dominated groups internalise views on their own needs which perpetuate their disadvantage, and why the experience of need does not always generate a wider questioning of dominance and subordination, but is instead defused by direction towards specialised publics and depoliticised discourse. It is also partly why the strategic meanings of practical needs are not always apparent to those experiencing them; e.g. 'I am unwell and I need a doctor', rather than 'I am unwell because I have a weak position within my household and I am overworked'. The discursive field around needs is a significant part of the mystification of gender relations.
However, there are moments when these depoliticising processes are challenged and disrupted and oppositional interpretations of need escape, needs and their solutions lose their quality of self evidence, and the enclave is threatened. This may happen in many ways, some of which may be entirely 'internal' to a particular society And others may be through wider dialogue. An example of this is the successful disruption of the enclaved character of the household in development studies needs talk. Runaway needs then are subject to struggles to redepoliticise and enclave the discourse, and may become the subject of institutional contests to regulate and provide.
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Thus one could possibly see that the runaway need of gendered poverty has come to be re-enclaved as the poverty of female headed households (Jackson 1996) and also thereby constituted a 'target group' which is less politicised, for development interventions, than intrahousehold 'interference'. The collapse of gender into the poverty trap appears from this perspective as a process of depolicitisation and the capture of a runaway need. To examine 'our'
(meaning gender researchers who see themselves as in dialogue with development policy and practice) role in this is to confront the ways in which we claim to represent oppositional needs talk, to define the content of new needs, and sometimes to be party to the domestication of runaway needs.
The institutionalisation of gender has in many ways reprivatised what was originally oppositional needs talk. The arguments against WID and women targeted activities, the enthusiasm for gender mainstreaming (Razawi and Miller 1995) , and the institutional adoption of the practical/strategic distinction as a vocabulary of gender need (Moser 1993 ) and gender training as a strategy for change, are discursive struggles, the outcomes of which are not yet known. New vocabularies, e.g. accountability, (Kardam, 1995; Goetz 1995) suited to new authoritative claims, are emerging to contest the bureaucratic reprivatisation of gender.
Universal vs Local 'Truths'
Poverty reduction then appears in poststructuralist perspectives as an imperialist narrative, universalising, essentialising and politically sinister since it justifies hegemonic development interventions.
Local 'truths' are seen to be an alternative. Localism is, of course, also found in development neo-populism, where, since the early 1980s, there has been an alternative understanding of well-being and illbeing grounded in local concepts and the self perceptions of the poor (Chambers 1983; Beck 1994) .
In these, a communitarianism notion of a unitary community is implicitly and explicitly posed as the source of counter narratives, resistance and subaltern voices. But the inconsistency which refuses to subject localism, and the idea of the local, to the same deconstruction as globalism reveals the con- They have divided conceptions of well-being, and accord voice differentially to their members in how local discourses of well-being are formed, and may exclude and marginalise as effectively as alien western concepts of well-being. Indeed Sherry Ortner criticises 'resistance studies' for their ethnographic 'thinness' which she sees as a consequence of a poststructural paralysis in the face of politics internal to subaltern groups (Ortner 1995) .
In addition to the concept of the unitary community, the relativistic notion of justice is incompatible with universalist ideas of gender justice. If 'a given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way -that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members' (Waltzer quoted by Glover p127) then potentially the subordination of women becomes just'. But what are these shared understandings?
Feminist critics (Benhabib 1995; Ortner 1995) have argued that cultures and communities cannot be represented as bounded wholes without internal politics, contradictions and debates, and without alternatives in the meanings and actions available to individuals. Benhabib suggests we need to distinguish between 'communities of conversation' and culturally specific ethnic communities, in which what determines who belongs to the former shifts with the subject of the 'conversation' and the 153 problem at hand. Such communities may sometimes coincide with ethnic boundaries but do not necessarily do so -'We are all participants in different communities of conversation as constituted by the intersecting axes of our different interests, projects and life situations ' (1995: 247) . This seems to me a concept which both reflects the internal (gender) politics of communities as well as capturing the sense in which many western and local 'feminists' do indeed 'talk' the same language and are engaged on the same project, without casting this conversation in terms of imperialism and hegemony A postmodern pessimism might suggest that subaltern women cannot speak (Spivak 1985) , but more hopeful approaches to communication and resistance see agency in silence (Rajan 1993; Mahoney 1996) , the possibility of voice and the refusals and reformulations of daily life as an ongoing dialogue between actors and the social structures they experience. One of the points made by Seyla Benhabib is that it is mistaken to conceptualise individuals as either insiders (participants) or outsiders (observers) in a particular society, for 'Individuals themelves can also become observers of their own ways of life if they acquire a critical distance from it and begin to challenge the normative order ' (1995: 238) . If the growth of this kind of social reflexivity occurs with modernity, as often claimed, then subaltern 'insiders', through stepping back and looking at their societies through another optic which might include universalist values, may be enabled to challenge discourses and act up and against.
Furthermore, if such individuals seek to enlist development discourses in these struggles -implicitly in actions or explicitly in speech -then why should one deny such claims?
